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I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Commercial Code succinctly states that "an accom-
modation party is one who signs the instrument in any capacity for the
purpose of lending his name to another party to it."' An accommodation
party who signs as a maker (or as a co-maker) is bound on the instru-
ment without any demand for payment being made upon the party
accommodated-the principal debtor. 2 On the other hand, if the accom-
modation party signs the instrument as an indorser he will not be liable
unless presentment for payment is made upon the maker and notice of
dishonor is given to him within the proper time.' An accommodation party
is often described as a "surety, ' 4 but it must be stressed that as an
accommodation party his rights and liabilities are governed first by the
Uniform Commercial Code and then secondarily governed by the general
suretyship rules applying to the usual surety. The accommodation party
is a species of the genus suretyship.
There is not, to the knowledge of the writer, any empirical study
as to why people become accommodation parties to negotiable instruments
and as to their knowledge of their liability which they incur by signing.
In a recent case, however, an accommodation party was asked why he
signed and his answer is probably representative of the chagrin of most
accommodation parties: "And I did do it for him. I don't know why, as I
said before, I should have had my head examined for doing it."5 Many
* Professor of Law, University of Miami.
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415(1) [Hereinafter cited as U.C.C.].
2. U.C.C. § 3-415, Comment 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Ebeling v. Lowry, 203 So.2d 506, 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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lawyers who have permitted their clients to become accommodation
parties may share this feeling.
This article is designed to develop a series of problems which might
arise in typical (if there is such a thing) lending transactions; hypo-
thetical fact patterns are used with the hope that they may aid the
reader in understanding the application of the legal principles.
II. DOES AN ACCOMMODATION PARTY WARRANT TO A SUBSEQUENT
HOLDER?
Assume that Don Debtor and Mary Debtor are joint payees of a
promissory note. Don Debtor agrees to pledge the note as collateral
for a loan. The lender, Lewis Lender, refuses to make the loan until Sam
Surety indorses the note for the accommodation of Mary Debtor. Don
Debtor then forges Mary's name as payee and Sam Surety innocently
signs his name. Don Debtor then indorses the note and delivers it to
Lewis Lender. At maturity, Don Debtor is insolvent and Mary Debtor
denies liability upon the ground of forgery. Does Lewis Lender have any
recourse against Sam Surety?
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law,6 Sam Surety would warrant
"that the instrument is genuine and in all respects what it purports to
be." He would be liable for breach of warranty for either the amount of
the loan, or the amount of what would have been received if there had
not been a forgery in accordance with the damage rule of the particular
jurisdiction in which suit was brought.' Insofar as warranty liability was
concerned, the N.I.L. lumped the unqualified indorser for value and the
accommodation indorser under the same rule: both classes of indorsers
warranted that the instrument was genuine.
The Uniform Commercial Code adopts a diametrically opposite
approach: "Any person who transfers an instrument and receives con-
sideration warrants to his transferee and if the transfer is by indorse-
ment to any subsequent holder who takes the instrument in good faith
that ...all signatures are genuine or authorized; . . .," The typical
"gratuitous" accommodation indorser who lends his name to another party
does not receive consideration; there is consideration for lending his
name (the original promise of the accommodated party to the creditor will
support the additional promise of the accommodation indorser), but the
accommodation indorser does not receive consideration for lending his
name. However, the comments point out that an accommodation indorser
may receive consideration from the creditor in certain cases, for example
6. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 65, 66 [Hereinafter cited as N.I.L.I.
7. Comment, Warranties on the Transfer of a Negotiable Instrument-U.C.C. § 3-417(2),
17 STAN. L. REv. 77, 87-91 (1964).
8. U.C.C. § 3-417 (emphasis supplied); see I W. HAwLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE
TO THE UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CODE 520-521 (1964).
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"where A and B buy goods and it is understood that A is to pay for all
of them and that B is to sign a note only as a surety for A."' In this
latter case it would appear that B has received consideration and should
be deemed to warrant that A's signature is genuine. This example in the
comments speaks about B receiving consideration from the payee of the
note, and this would seem to fit the literal wording of Section 3-417.
However, if B should receive consideration from A directly rather than
from the payee, would A receive consideration in the sense that these
words are used in 3-417? The comments are not of any great assistance
in solving this problem, and the author suggests that courts may, perhaps,
impose this warranty liability on accommodation indorsers in this latter
situation.
If we revert back to the original example given above concerning the
forgery of Mary Debtor's signature, it may be questioned whether this
warranty discussion is much ado about nothing because another section
of the Code states that "every indorser engages that upon dishonor . . .
he will pay the instrument according to its tenor at the time of his indorse-
ment to the holder ... 2 0 Further, a comment to this section states that
"all indorsers incur this liability, without regard to whether or not the
indorser transferred the instrument for value or received consideration
for his indorsement.""l This section seems to impose liability on any
indorser on a contractual basis rather than on a warranty basis, and the
holder (and his attorney) is concerned with payment rather than with
any particular theory of liability. If one stops at this point, it is quite
true that as a general rule an unqualified indorser will be liable on his
indorsement contract as well as his warranty contract; if the unqualified
indorser does not receive consideration he will not be liable as a warrantor
but he will still be liable on his contract of indorsement. However, this
general rule is subject to the exception followed by many courts that an
accommodation party will not be liable when there is no principal debt for
which he is acting as a surety.12
A similar result can seemingly be reached under the Code. Under
section 3-407 forgery of the payee's signature "discharges any party
whose contract is thereby changed" and a comment notes that "The
contract of any party is necessarily affected, however, by the discharge
of any party against whom he has a right of recourse on the instrument."' 3
Under section 3-404, the accommodation indorser would have no rights on
the instrument against the payee (Mary Debtor) whose signature was
forged. Finally, under section 3-415(3) oral proof would be admissible
to give the accommodation party the benefit of discharges dependent on
9. U.C.C. § 3-415, Comment 2.
10. U.C.C. § 3-414(l).
11. U.C.C. § 3-414, Comment 1.
12. L. SIMPSON, SunrRysmp 271-272 (1950).
13. U.C.C. § 3-407 (2) (a); Comment 3c.
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his character as such against our hypothetical Lewis Lender who took with
actual notice of Sam Surety's status as an accommodation indorser.
We add a new dimension to our problem if we now assume that
Lewis Lender negotiates the promissory note to a holder in due course
who has no notice that Sam Surety signed the note as an accommodation
party. It seems clear under the Code that Sam Surety could not introduce
parol evidence to show his accommodation status in order to assert the
defense of discharge as he could in the prior paragraph. 4
We can further complicate matters by assuming that Sam Surety's
indorsement preceded the forged indorsement of Mary Debtor and the
true signature of Don Debtor. Sam Surety's signature would then be an
irregular or anomalous indorsement. This anomalous indorsement shows
that it is not in the chain of title and it gives notice to subsequent in-
dorsees that Sam Surety is an accommodation indorser and parol evidence
may then be introduced to give Sam Surety the benefit of discharge as
an accommodation indorser. 5
It seems most unfortunate that the Code eliminated any kind of
warranty liability of the accommodation indorser. Lewis Lender would not
have lent the money without the indorsement of Sam Surety and now this
indorsement has proven to be worthless. The approach of New York in
providing that an accommodation indorser warrants to any subsequent good
faith holder who is not the party accommodated that signatures on the
instrument are genuine, that the instrument has not been materially
altered, that all prior parties had capacity to contract and that the ac-
commodation party has no knowledge of any insolvency proceedings insti-
tuted regarding the maker, acceptor or drawer of an unaccepted instru-
ment does give the holder the benefit of his bargain."
III. Is AN ACCOMMODATION PARTY WHO SIGNS AFTER MATURITY OF
THE INSTRUMENT BOUND TO A HOLDER?
Assume that Don Debtor has given a note to Lewis Lender and
the note is now due. Lender now asks Don Debtor to secure the accom-
modation indorsement of Sam Surety. Lewis Lender at the time of this
request made no statements to Don Debtor that the time of payment
would be extended if this additional signature were secured. Don Debtor
induces Sam Surety to indorse the note while it is in the hands of Lewis
Lender. Is Sam Surety liable to Lewis Lender? Prior to the advent of
the Code, the general view in the United States was that Sam Surety
would not be liable because there was no consideration for his signature
14. U.C.C. § 3-415(3). See S. KnwYoN & MCCLURE, A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 562 (1964); and S. KINYON & R. McCLuRE, A STUDY OF THE
15. U.C.C. § 3-415(4).
16. N.Y. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-415.
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on these facts. However, if the original borrowing agreement between
Don Debtor and Lewis Lender provided that Don would secure an
accommodation party on the note, the signing after maturity would be
deemed to relate back to the original agreement and the subsequent
accommodation indorsement would be supported by consideration.'" Like-
wise, if the original lending agreement provided that Don Debtor would
furnish additional security for the payment of the note at a later date,
the signature of Sam Surety, given after default, would be supported by
consideration (in the view of some courts) because again it would relate
back to the original lending of Lewis Lender.19 If Lewis Lender in our
hypothetical problem agreed with Don Debtor to extend the time for
payment subsequent to default upon a promise that Sam Surety would
indorse the note, then Sam Surety's engagement would be supported by
consideration.
20
Two Florida cases, Conn v. Boulevard National Bank2" and Ebeling
v. Lowry,22 factually involved the question of consideration for the sig-
nature of an accommodation party after default, but neither case clearly
raised the issue. In Conn the original note provided that the payee had
the right to demand "additional securities to the satisfaction of the
Payee,"'2 1 and the individual accommodation indorser (who was president
of the corporate maker) indorsed after default. The court upheld the lia-
bility of the accommodation indorser apparently upon the basis that the
indorsement was "security" under the original lending agreement, although
the specific issue of consideration was not articulated. In Ebeling the
original maker was told by the holder that he would be sued unless he
produced a co-signer "to guarantee the payments."24 The court upheld
the joinder of the original maker and the accommodation co-maker ac-
commodation party in one suit upon the authority of Conn. Again, the
consideration issue was not discussed.
The U.C.C. provides that when an instrument has been taken for
value before it is due the accommodation party is liable in the capacity
in which he has signed.2" The comments explain that this provision is
designed to change some decisions which have held that there is no con-
sideration when an accommodation party signs a note after it is in the hands
of a holder who has given value. The accommodation party is liable "even
though there is no extension of time or other concession."2 6 Although
17. W. BRnroN, BILLS AND NOTES 255-231 (2d ed. 1961).
18. W. BRITToN, BILS AND NOTES 222 (2d ed. 1961).
19. The cases pro and con are discussed in Annot., 167 A.L.R. 1174 (1947); 11 AM.
JUR. 2d Bills & Notes § 240 (1963); W. BarrroN, BILLS AND NOTES 226-227 (2d ed. 1961).
20. W. BRrrToN, supra note 18, at 226.
21. 148 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
22. 203 So.2d 506 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
23. 148 So.2d 758 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963).
24. 203 So.2d 506, 507 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
25. U.C.C. 1 3-415(2).
26. U.C.C. § 3-415, Comment 3.
ACCOMMODATION PARTIES
this comment seems to be directed to a situation where the note is not in
default, it would seem broad enough to encompass a signing after default.
If consideration is not needed in the first situation it should not be neces-
sary in the second. This construction would seem consistent with another
section of the Code which provides that "no consideration is necessary
for an instrument or obligation thereon given in payment of or as security
for an antecedent obligation of any kind. 27 The comments note that this
clause encompasses a case where an indorsement of a note is given as
security for a debt already owed by a third party and that no extension
of time or other concession is given by the creditor.28
The signing after maturity by an accommodation party may present
an additional problem. If we assume that an instrument has been indorsed
prior to maturity by an accommodation indorser, will he be affected by the
addition of another accommodation indorser's signature subsequent to
maturity? A number of relatively old cases have held that a surety would
be discharged by the addition of another accommodation party's indorse-
ment on the theory that the contract of the first accommodation party had
been changed. 9 Of course there has been a change in the contract, but
the change would in most cases be beneficial rather than detrimental.
It is believed that the U.C.C. will result in an overruling of this
authority. The Code provides that any change "in . . . the number or
relations of the parties" will constitute a "material" change.Y0 The com-
ments note that "the addition of a co-maker or a surety does not change
in most jurisdictions the contract of one who has already signed as maker
and should not be held material as to him."3' 1 Although the comment refers
to "makers," by analogy the principle could be extended to accommodation
indorsers. Even if a court should refuse to draw this analogy and hold
that the second accommodation indorsement was a material change, it
should hold that the first accommodation indorser would not be dis-
charged unless it was further established that the change was "both fraud-
ulent and material.13 2
IV. RIGHTS OF CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN SUCCESSIVE
ACCOMMVODATION PARTIES
Assume that Don Debtor wishes to borrow $10,000 from Lewis
Lender in return for a note signed by Don Debtor. Lewis Lender agrees
to make the loan if Don Debtor can secure the indorsements of two
27. U.C.C. § 3-408.
28. U.C.C. § 3-408, Comment 2. See 1 W. HAWKLAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 562 (1964); and S. KiNYON & R. MCCLURE, A STUDY OF T3E
EFFCT OF THE UNIFORM COMM]ERCIAL CODE ON MINNESOTA LAW 340-341 (1964).
29. L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 335-336 (1950).
30. U.C.C. § 3-407(1) (a).
31. U.C.C. § 3-407, Comment 1.
32. U.C.C. § 3-407(2) (a). Cf. Katskd v. Boehm, 36 L.W. 2685 (Md. App. 1968).
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accommodation indorses whose credit rating is satisfactory to Lewis. Don
Debtor then induces Sam Surety to indorse and, on the following day,
Don Debtor persuades Albert Accommodating to indorse below the sig-
nature of Sam Surety. The note is delivered and the loan is made. Don
Debtor defaults and Lewis Lender makes demand upon Albert Accom-
modating who pays, and he, in turn, calls upon Sam Surety to pay the
entire amount. Sam will assert that he is liable for only one-half of the
amount paid on the basis that he is a co-surety and liable for a contrib-
utive share, rather than the entire amount. Albert Accommodating will
counter that Sam Surety is not a co-surety, and he is liable for the entire
amount as an indorser.
Prior to the Code, Albert Accommodating would base his argument
on the N.I.L. which provided that "as respects one another, indorsers
are liable prima facie in the order in which they indorse; but evidence
is admissible to show that as between or among themselves they have
agreed otherwise."3 The majority of courts have construed this section
to mean that there would not be any right of contribution between suc-
cessive indorsers unless there was proof that the two accommodation in-
dorsers in fact signed as co-sureties pursuant to an agreement between
themselves. 4 The mere fact that Albert Accommodating might have been
informed by Don Debtor that Sam Surety had also signed for Debtor's
accommodation could not create any kind of an implied agreement between
the two accommodation indorsers to share the burden under a contribution
theory. 5 The U.C.C. offers even less solace to Sam Surety: "Unless they
otherwise agree indorsers are liable to one another in the order in which
they indorse, which is presumed to be the order in which their signatures
appear on the instrument."" The comments note that parol evidence is
admissible to show that the indorsers have indorsed in another order "or
that they have otherwise agreed as to their liability to one another."17
Except for any possible difference insofar as the words "prima facie"
and "presumed" connote an increased burden of persuasion, courts which
have refused to apply a contribution remedy in our hypothetical fact
situation may continue to do so.
It may be interesting to note that if Sam Surety and Albert Accom-
modating had become sureties for Don Debtor on a contract which was not
negotiable (e.g., a building or sale of goods contract) the usual rules of
33. N.I.L. § 68.
34. W. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 597-600 (2d ed. 1961). Compare 10 S. WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1262 (3d ed. 1967).
35. Both Britton and Williston have criticized the cases articulating this result. W.
BRITTONr, BIus AND NOTES 598-600 (2d ed. 1961) and 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1262
(3d ed. 1967). Compare, 1 W. HAWELAND, A TRANSACTIONAL GUIDE TO THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 565 (1964) in his discussion of U.C.C. § 3-414.
36. U.C.C. § 3-414(2). See S. KINYON & R. MCCLURE, A STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ON MINNESOTA LAW 355-359 (1964).
37. U.C.C. § 3-414, Comment 4.
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contribution between the two sureties would apply even though they
signed at different times and without agreeing among themselves as to
the contribution aspect.8 It is primarily in the negotiable instrument
area that the suretyship rules are modified.
When one tries to apply the Florida law to our original hypothetical
problem, the apparent "simplicity" of result under the U.C.C. seems to
vanish. A recently amended Florida statute provides:3 9
When a person executes any bond, note, draft or bill of exchange
and two (2) or more persons execute it jointly with him, merely
as his sureties, or endorse any note or draft or bill of exchange
as sureties for the maker or drawer for his accommodation and
without consideration, said persons are bound to each other
for a proportional contribution of the amount of said bond, note,
draft or bill of exchange. If any person is compelled to pay any
part of said bond, note, draft or bill of exchange, he may sue
his cosurety for contribution separately or jointly. Defendants,
whether sureties, accommodation joint makers or accommoda-
tion endorsers may be sued separately or jointly.
Under the above statute it would seem clear that if two or more makers
"jointly" (in the sense of acting in concert) executed a note and some of
the co-makers were sureties for the principal-debtor-maker, the sureties
would have a right of contribution against him. What is not clear, how-
ever, is whether the word "jointly" is limited to those persons who act in
concert in one transaction as distinguished from the case where the
principal-debtor-maker induces one friend to co-sign as maker on one
day and induces another friend to co-sign on the following day and
neither co-maker-surety has any kind of agreement with the other. This
uncertainty becomes more pronounced when one looks at the words "or
endorse any note ... as sureties for the maker ... for his accommodation
and without consideration." Does the word "jointly" in the preceding
clause, modify these words, or does the quoted clause operate independ-
ently to provide that consecutive accommodation indorsers are liable to
each other on a contribution theory regardless of the fact that they did
not "endorse" together in one setting or group? Although the answer is
not free from doubt, it is suggested that successive indorsers should be
liable for a "proportional contribution" even though they might not have
acted "jointly." This view is supported by another recently amended
statute.40 The statute first provides that makers and sureties, who become
parties "at or before the execution and delivery" of the instrument, "or
are otherwise secondarily liable for payment," may be sued in the same
38. See generally 10 S. WMLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1277A (3d ed. 1967).
39. FLA. STAT. § 46.011 (1967), as amended, Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, S.B. 441
(1967).
40. FLA. STAT. 1 46.041 (1967), as amended, Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, S.B. 441
(1967).
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action, and it requires that the judgment specify who are secondarily
liable as indorsers or sureties. Finally,
(3) When a final judgment authorized by this section is paid
by one or more defendants who are liable only as endorser,
surety, guarantor, or otherwise secondarily, the holder of such
judgment shall, on request, assign such judgment to the de-
fendants paying it. Such defendants are entitled to all the
rights and remedies of the original plaintiff to enforce collection
from the other defendants who are liable.
The use of the word "defendants" is confusing. In the second line of the
quoted material the word "defendants" includes those who are secondar-
ily liable, and the same meaning seems to be attributed to the word
"defendants" in line five. However, is the word "defendants" in line seven
used with the same intention? If it is, then "proportional contribution"
would seem to be the result. On the other hand, if the word "defendants"
in line seven has this narrow meaning, then it would seem to imply in-
directly that an accommodation party who paid the judgment would have
no recourse against the principal debtor. This statute, before its recent
amendment, stated that a secondarily liable person who paid the judg-
ment would be
entitled to all the rights and remedies of the original plaintiff in
such judgment or under execution thereon to enforce the collec-
tion of the same from the defendants who are liable as makers
of the instrument sued upon.4'
The District Court of Appeal, Second District held under the original
statute that an accommodation party who received an assignment of the
original judgment from the judgment creditor could not enforce the judg-
ment against a co-indorser and guarantor of the note.42 The amended
statute has overruled this case.
It may be possible to reconcile the various possibilities presented by
this amended statute. It is submitted that this amended statute merely
reiterates a right of contribution against accommodation indorsers to be
enforced by means of an assignment of the original judgment. It should
not be interpreted to mean that it is intended to eliminate the right of
recourse which a paying accommodation party has, independently of this
remedial statute, to recover against the principal debtor-the maker of
the instrument. If this view of the author is correct, then the two statutes
cumulatively seem, perhaps, to give a right of contribution to accommo-
dation parties even though they have not acted in concert.
If this latter view is correct, then one additional problem remains:
41. FLA. STAT. § 46.11 (1965) (emphasis added).
42. Freed v. Giuliani, 164 So.2d 234 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964)
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the U.C.C. did not repeal these statutes48 and are we faced with an irrecon-
cilable conflict? It would seem that a court could say that the U.C.C.
provisions are designed to apply to the ordinary indorser who has in-
dorsed for consideration and that the two Florida statutes are designed
to supplement the Code in the narrow area of accommodation parties; the
rules do not conflict-the parochial Florida statutes have merely carved
out an exception to the general rule.
V. THE RIGHT OF AN ACCOM'MODATION PARTY TO UTILIZE SUBROGATION
AGAINST A Co-AcCOMMODATION PARTY.
Assume that Don Debtor wishes to borrow $10,000 from Lewis
Lender. Lewis Lender is willing to make the loan if Don Debtor can
induce Sam Surety and Albert Accommodating to sign a note as co-makers
with Don Debtor. The note is signed by all three parties and Lewis
Lender makes the loan. Don Debtor is completely insolvent at the time
of maturity, and Albert Accommodating is thrown into involuntary bank-
ruptcy soon thereafter. Lewis Lender makes demand for payment upon
Sam Surety and Sam pays the full amount owing. As we have seen,'"
Sam would have a right to a fifty percent contribution ($5,000) from his
co-maker, Albert Accommodating. And if we assume that the bankrupt
estate has sufficient assets to make a distribution of fifty cents on the
dollar, a claim based on the contribution principle would result in Sam
Surety recovering $2,500.
If, on the other hand, Sam Surety should utilize the theory of sub-
rogation (rather than contribution) he will recover $5,000 in our prob-
lem. Under the subrogation theory, Sam Surety will step into the shoes
of Lewis Lender for the full amount ($10,000) of the original debt which
Sam Surety paid insofar as a claim against the bankrupt estate of Albert
Accommodating is concerned.45 The estate is able to pay fifty cents on the
dollar, so Sam Surety will receive $5,000, which is the exact amount that
Albert Accommodating owed him under the theory of contribution.46 It
may be objected that this subrogation approach will result in an un-
justified windfall to Sam Surety if the bankrupt estate is able to pay
more than fifty cents on the dollar. If the estate is able to pay seventy-
five cents on the dollar, Sam Surety should receive $7,500, or $2,500
more than he is entitled to. Fortunately, the subrogation rule is subject
to a countervailing principle: the dividends received from the bankrupt
estate under a subrogation principle are limited to the amount due Sam
43. FLA. STAT. § 680.10-102 to 104 (1967).
44. See notes 33-34 supra.
45. FLA. STAT. § 46.041 (1967) as amended Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-254, S.B. 441 (1967),
which was discussed in the text accompanying note 40 supra, is merely a legislative codi-
fication of this general subrogation principle.
46. Restatement of Security 1 162 (1941); L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 222-223 (1950);
10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1271 (3d ed. 1967).
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Surety by means of the contribution principle. Hence, Sam Surety can
never receive more than $5,000 in our hypothetical example.47
If we revert back to our original subrogation example wherein Sam
Surety received $5,000, it may be objected that he will receive twice as
much as other unsecured creditors of the bankrupt estate and that this
does not seem fair. Why should money be taken from the pockets of
other unsecured creditors to give a windfall to Sam Surety? The usual
answer (which may not satisfy the reader) is that since Lewis Lender
could have filed a claim against the bankrupt estate for the entire amount
of the note ($10,000) the other unsecured creditors are not put in a
worse position when this right is filed by the co-surety, Sam Surety. It
is true that if Lewis Lender had filed a claim for $10,000 (the entire
amount of the note) he would have received a dividend of $5,000 (fifty
cents on the dollar), the same amount received by Sam Surety when he
filed his subrogation claim. Lewis Lender after receiving his $5,000 from
the bankrupt estate would now proceed against Sam Surety for the
remainder ($5,000), and we would have the same result as if Sam Surety
had originally paid the $10,000. To further "prove" our equation, if the
bankrupt estate paid seventy-five cents on the dollar, the estate would pay
Lewis Lender $7,500 and the trustee then would have a claim against
Sam Surety for $2,500 and Lewis Lender would also have a claim against
Sam Surety for the remaining $2,500. The opponents of the general rule
are really saying that although subrogation is proper in most situations,
it is not when one co-surety has become bankrupt. 8
VI. RELEASE OF ACCOMMODATION PARTY BY THE HOLDER'S IMPAIRMENT
OF RECOURSE OR RELEASE OF COLLATERAL: RESERVATION OF RIGHTS
If the number of reported cases is any criterion, one of the most
troublesome areas in accommodation paper deals with the modification of
the original loan contract and its effect upon the rights of the parties.
Assume that Don Debtor induces Sam Surety and Albert Accommodating
to sign a note as co-makers with him. The note is issued to Lewis Lender
and it is secured by a security interest in goods (or by a real estate
mortgage) given by Don Debtor. It is the general rule that if Lewis
Lender should subsequently agree with Don Debtor to extend the time
for payment under a "binding agreement,"4 or should reduce the interest
rate, he will be deemed to have released Sam Surety and Albert Accom-
modating from any liability on the note."0 In a somewhat similar vein, a
47. RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 162 (1941); 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1271 (3d
ed. 1967).
48. 3 COLT R ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 57.21[7] and 63.18[2] (14th ed. J. Moore 1967).
49. Cole v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 183 So.2d 195 (Fla. 1966); N.I.L. § 120 (6); U.C.C.
§ 3-606(1) (a); L. SIMPSON, SURETYSMP 351 (1950) ; W. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 292
(2d ed. 1961).
50. L. SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP 333-334 (1950). But cf. U.C.C. § 3-407, Comment 3b.
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material modification of any provision of the note or the underlying
security agreement will also release the two co-maker sureties.5 ' Like-
wise, if Lewis Lender should release Albert Accommodating he will also
be deemed to have released Sam Surety, and if Lewis Lender should
release Don Debtor he will also inadvertently release both of the co-
makers.52 Finally, if Lewis Lender should release all of the property in-
cumbered by the security interest he will likewise have released both Sam
Surety and Albert Accommodating.53 When Lewis Lender releases only a
part of the property from the lien of the security agreement, there is a
split of authority: some courts say that the release of any of the security
releases the accommodation parties entirely, while other courts hold that
that is a pro tanto discharge. 4 Under either view, Lewis Lender is ad-
versely affected by his act of generosity.
These suretyship rules need not be traps for the unwary because
the same rules which provide for the discharge of the accommodation
parties also provide three means of preserving Lewis Lender's rights of
recourse against accommodation parties.
It is well established that the original note may provide that the
accommodation parties assent or consent to extensions of time of payment,
modification of other terms of payment or enforcement of security, etc.
at the option of the holder and without notice to the accommodation
parties, and these provisions will permit the holder to do any of these
acts without releasing or discharging the accommodation parties.
In the event that the original note fails to evidence the assent or
consent of the accommodation parties to actions by the holder which would
discharge them in the ordinary case, they may, of course, express their
consent at a later time when the holder manifests his intention to extend
the time of payment, release a co-accommodation party, etc.5 Of course,
accommodation parties may be disinclined to give this consent unless they
have a personal interest in seeing that the boon is extended to the prin-
cipal debtor. For example, the president of a corporation who has signed
for the accommodation of the corporation may be anxious to secure an
extension of time for payment by the corporation and be willing to con-
sent to an extension of his own liability in return for this boon to the
corporation. It should be noted that if the holder of the instrument should
enter into a binding agreement to extend the time of payment with the
principal debtor without securing the consent of the accommodation party
51. L. SI PSON, SURETYSHIP 340 (1950).
52. N.I.L. § 120(5); U.C.C. § 3-606(1) (a).
53. W. BRITTON, Bis AND NOTES § 292 (2d ed. 1961); U.C.C. 1 3-606(1) (a).
54. Compare W. BrTTON, BIrs AND NOTES § 292 (2d ed. 1961).
55. N.I.L. § 120(6) binding extension of time; U.C.C. § 3-606(1), Comment 2 and
§ 3-118(f); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY '§ 122 (1941); Bleakley and Sarasota Bank, 194
So.2d 918 (FIa. 2d Dist. 1967) ; 10 S. WILiIsTON, CONTRACTS § 1223 (3d ed. 1967).
56. U.C.C. '§ 3-606, Comment 2.
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to remain bound, the consent may be secured afterwards and it does not
require any consideration to bind the accommodation party. 7 Of course,
any hope that an overlooked accommodation party may be this coopera-
tive will be a risky thing at best.
Still a third protective device is available to the holder of the note.
The holder may reserve his rights of recourse against the accommodation
parties in the same instrument by which he extends the time for payment,
or releases one party to the instrument, etc., provided that the accommoda-
tion party against whom recourse is reserved is notified of the fact. As a
practical matter, a carbon copy of the extension agreement should be
given immediately to the accommodation party.5" It may be thought to be
unjust to allow the holder of the instrument to modify the original loan
agreement or to release collateral or a party to the note and, at the same
time, to reserve his rights against the accommodation party. However, the
apparent injustice disappears when it is noted that the accommodation
party is not necessarily harmed by the unilateral act of the holder. The
accommodation party may tender full payment to the holder59 and then
immediately proceed against the principal debtor on the theory of reim-
bursement.8 0 In this case the extension of time (or other relief extended
by the holder) will be of no avail to the principal debtor. The accommoda-
tion party may also immediately demand that the principal debtor exon-
erate the accommodation party from any possible loss. The accommodation
party has an arsenal of defensive weapons-reimbursement, exoneration
and contribution-which he may utilize against the principal debtor or
against the collateral given to secure the instrument."' The real danger
is not to the accommodation party but to the improvident holder who re-
57. 10 S. WILLSTON, CONTRACTS '§ 1223 (3d ed. 1967); U.C.C. 1§ 3-606, Comment 2.
See London Leasing Corp. v. Interfina, Inc., 53 Misc. 2d 657, 279 N.Y.S.2d 209 (Sup. Ct.
1967), noted in 85 BANKING L.J. 258 (1968).
58. U.C.C. § 3-606, Comment 4 states that the express reservation of rights "to be
effective must be accompanied by notification to any party against whom rights are so
reserved." This comment does not clearly state that the reservation of rights must be in
writing. Many courts have used the parol evidence rule to deny admission of any parol
evidence that the creditor has reserved his rights against accommodation parties. Compare 10
S. WrLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1230 (3d ed. 1967) with 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 732-760 (1951).
See also the penetrating analysis in the case of Parnes v. Celia's, Inc. (N.J. Super. Ct.) 36
U.S. L.W. 2520-2521 (1968).
It should also be noted that it was not necessary under the Code for the obligee
to give notice to the accommodation maker of the express reservation of rights
against him when granting the obligor a time extension. N.J.S. 12A: 3-606(2). The
section is devoid of any provision for such notice. Official Comment 4 to Section
3-606 is misleading in its allusion to a requirement of notice, referring to a sup-
posed subsection (3). There is no subsection (3) in Section 3-606 as finally
adopted by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and enacted in this State.
There was such a subsection in the 1952 draft of the Code, which called for a
diligent effort by the holder to notify the party affected as to the reservation,
within ten days. But that subsection (3) was omitted from the final draft of the
Code section and is of no effect, notwithstanding that Official Comment 4 was not
revised concordantly. Conford, J.
59. U.C.C. § 3-604.
60. U.C.C. § 3-415(5).
61. E.g., RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY '§ 129, comment d and § 122, comment d.
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leases the principal debtor or modifies the note without reserving his
rights of recourse against the accommodation parties.
The first paragraph of this section used the phrase "binding agree-
ment," and a further discussion of this phrase would seem to be in order.
The Negotiable Instruments Law formerly provided that a person second-
arily liable on the instrument was discharged "by any agreement binding
upon the holder to extend the time of payment" unless the secondary
party assented to the extension or the holder reserved his right of recourse
against the secondary party.62 In accordance with the word "binding,"
the Florida courts consistently held that any agreement between the
holder and the primary debtor to extend the time of payment would not
be "binding" unless it was supported by adequate consideration, such as
the advance payment of interest by the debtor, or a promise to pay
interest upon interest.63 If the agreement to extend the time of payment
was not supported by this adequate consideration, then the secondary
party would not be discharged. This Florida position was in accordance
with the pre-code majority view. 4
The U.C.C. provides that the holder discharges any party to the
instrument when he agrees with any person "to suspend the right to
enforce against such person the instrument or collateral or otherwise
discharges such person."65 It is to be noted that the Code has eliminated
the word "binding." The comments to this section make no reference to
the intention of the draftsmen as to whether the former rule of considera-
tion was retained. A prior section states that a holder "may even without
consideration discharge any party . . . by renouncing his rights by a
writing signed and delivered .. . ."6 It would seem that if a holder may
renounce his rights entirely without consideration, he ought to be able to
extend the time of payment without consideration. Likewise, if an ac-
commodation party may bind himself without consideration by agreeing
to remain liable on the instrument after the creditor has extended the
time of payment to the principal debtor, then any necessity for considera-
tion in making the extension "binding" seems a bit inconsistent. 7 On the
other hand, it has been stated that this Code provision was not intended
to change the former rule. 8 Professor Britton has argued in favor of the
62. N.I.L. § 120(6).
63. E.g., Card v. Commercial Bank, 119 So.2d 404 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1960); Fort Pierce
Bank v. Sewall, 113 Fla. 811, 152 So. 617 (1934); L. & S. Enterprises v. Miami Tile & Ter-
razzo, Inc., 148 So.2d 299 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963); Williams v. Peninsular Grocery Co., 73
Fla. 937, 75 So. 517 (1917).
64. W. BRITTON, BILs AND NOTES 685-89; 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS '§ 1222 (3d ed.
1967).
65. U.C.C. § 3-606(1) (a).
66. U.C.C. § 3-605(1)(b).
67. See Note 57 supra.
68. R. Cosway, Negotiable Instruments-A Comparison of Washington Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, printed in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN WASHINGTON
377-378 (1967). Compare the more qualified view of Penney, A Summary of Articles 3 and
4 and their Impact in New York, 48 CORNELL L. J. 47,72 (1962).
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rule requiring a binding agreement and the concomitant discharge of
the surety because, unless the surety was discharged, the creditor could
require payment from the surety who upon payment would be free to
sue the principal debtor for reimbursement. "It is to avoid this anomalous
result that the surety is discharged."6 9 Britton admits that this "anom-
alous result" may occur if the creditor reserves his rights against the
surety at the same time that he enters into a binding extension agreement
with the principal debtor because the surety may then opt to pay the
creditor and proceed immediately against the principal debtor.7
To summarize, if the courts follow prior authority then gratuitous
extension agreements will not serve to discharge the accommodation parties
while binding agreements will do so unless the holder reserves his rights
against the accommodation parties. Until the courts have taken a definitive
position, it would seem wise for all extension agreements ("binding" or
gratitutous) to provide for a reservation of rights against accommodation
parties.
VII. REQUIRED FORMALITIES OF SIGNATURES BY WIVES
WHO AE AcCOMMODATION PARTIES
The Florida Constitution provides that a wife's separate property
"shall not be liable for the debts of her husband without her consent
given by some instrument in writing executed according to the law re-
specting conveyances by married women."'7 The Supreme Court of
Florida has interpreted the word "conveyance" to include the conveyance
of real property as well as the "conveyance" of personal property, and
that the statutes setting forth the requirements for "conveyances" at the
time of any particular transaction would govern rather than the statutory
definition of conveyances at the time of the adoption of the Constitution
of 1885.72 The present statutes require that a conveyance of land must
be by an instrument signed by the grantor and the signature must
be witnessed by two witnesses. 73 The joinder by the husband is re-
quired when the wife is conveying her separate real estate.74 On the
other hand, there are no statutes articulating specific formalities for
the "conveyance" of personal property and the wife may "convey"
this personal propel ty without the joinder of her husband.75 The question
remains: "What does the word 'conveyance' really mean in this constitu-
69. W. BUiTToN, BI.Ls AND NoTEs 685 (2d ed. 1961).
70. Id.
71. FLA. CoNsT. art. i1, § 1.
72. Springfield Co. v. Ely, 44 Fla. 319, 32 So. 892 (1902).
73. FLA. STAT. '§ 689.01 (1967) an acknowledgment of the grantor's signature, the ad-
dress of the grantee on the deed and the name and address of the party drafting the instru-
ment are required for recording of the instrument. FLA. STAT. § 695.03-695.04, 695.21 and
Fla. Laws, ch. 67-53, S.B. 201 (1967).
74. FLA. STAT. §§ 693.01 and 708.08 (1967).
75. FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1967).
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tional provision?" It seems rather clear that if the wife merely signs the
note as a co-maker 76 or she merely indorses it as an accommodation indorser
for the debt of her husband who has signed as maker, her signature will
not bind her separate property."7 However, it would appear that if col-
lateral (e.g., corporate stock) which is owned in whole or in part by the
wife is described in the note and the note provides that the wife consents
to the pledging of the collateral for the debt of her husband, this will
comply with the constitutional mandate even though the wife's signature
is not witnessed.78 In a similar vein, if collateral (again corporate stock)
is "attached to and made a part of the note"7 ' and this collateral is owned
by the wife, at least this separate property-the corporate stock-will be
liable for the debts of her husband.
If we assume that the wife's separate property consists of real
property or tangible personal property which may not be physically
annexed to the promissory note, the problem becomes more complex.
It would appear that the wife's separate property (both real and tangible
personal property) must either be described in the note or in a separate
instrument which is incorporated by reference into the promissory note.
It would also seem advisable that the wife's signature on the note or on
the incorporated instrument should be attested by two witnesses and
acknowledged, and if the collateral consists of real property the husband
should also join in the execution of the note or the incorporated instru-
ment.8 o
The constitutional provision speaks of "the debts of her husband."'"
and it becomes important to determine in certain cases whether the debt
of the husband or a third person is involved. For example, if the husband
and wife should jointly sign an instrument guaranteeing credit purchases
made by a corporation it has been held that the debt is the debt of the
corporation and not that of the husband even though it would appear
that the husband may have been in control of the corporation,8 2 and she
will be liable when she is an accommodation indorser for a corporation in
which she is the owner of one-half of the corporate stock and of which
her husband is president. In this latter case it would appear that the wife's
other separate property would be liable also and not only the corporate
stock which she pledged.8 3 In a similar vein, the wife's separate property
is liable when she and her husband sign as accommodation makers of a
note executed by a corporation even though her husband has an interest
76. Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So.2d 858 (1947).
77. Kovens v. Bluestone, 145 So.2d 473 (Fla. 1962).
78. Springfield Co. v. Ely, 44 Fla. 319, 32 So. 892 (1902).
79. Chisholm v. Coconut Grove Exch. Bank, 144 Fla. 770, 771, 198 So. 703 (1940).
80. Pilson v. Guillery, 168 So.2d 547 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); Matthews v. McCain, 125
Fla. 840, 170 So. 323 (1936).
81. FLA. CONST. art. 11, § 1.
82. Continental Can Co. v. Lee Co., 40 So.2d 783 (Fla. 1949).
83. Weinstein v. Susskind, 162 So.2d 683 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
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in the corporation. 4 There is a certain superficial appeal to the notion
that the wife is binding her separate property for the debts of the corpora-
tion rather than for the debts of her husband, but is this notion necessarily
valid? Under the U.C.C. if the words "payment guaranteed" are added
to a signature, the signer promises that he will pay the instrument "with-
out resort by the holder to any other party."85 The comments note that
when these words are added to the signature of an indorser "the liability
of the indorser becomes indistinguishable from that of a co-maker."8
Under this view, the wife who is guaranteeing payment for the corpora-
tion is also guaranteeing payment for her hubsand when the corporation
fails to pay the instrument.
If we take the simple case of a husband and wife signing as accom-
modation makers or as accommodation indorsers for the benefit of the
corporation in which the husband has an interest (a close corporation
which may be owned entirely by the husband), do we not have a some-
what similar situation? It is true that the primary debt is between the
corporation and the holder of the note and the husband and wife have
jointly bound themselves to pay this primary debt in the event of default
by the corporation. However, as between the husband and wife there is
a secondary debt concept involved: the wife will be liable if the husband
fails to pay when the corporation defaults and vice versa. In effect each
accommodation spouse is back-stopping the other spouse's debt upon de-
fault by the primary debtor-the corporation. It should be noted that a
similar argument has been raised before the Supreme Court of Florida
and rejected by some non-responsive citations of authority.87
It would appear rather obvious that when a husband and wife em-
bark upon some form of joint venture, and the spouses execute a prom-
issory note, the wife is not promising to pay "the debts of her husband"
and she is liable for the entire amount of the note when she is sued by an
accommodation indorser who has paid the original holder.88
A rather unusual application of this "debt of the husband" concept
84. Marinelli v. Weaver, 187 So.2d 690 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
85. U.C.C. § 3-416(1). The pre-Code law in Florida was the same. Quarngesser v.
Appliance Buyers Credit Corp., 187 So.2d 662 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
86. U.C.C. § 3-416, Comment.
87. Continental Can Co. v. Lee Co., 40 So.2d 783, 784 (Fla. 1949). The court cited
the Married Woman's Emancipation Act, Fla. Stat. 1§ 708.08 (1943), as an answer to this
contention upon the basis that the act removed her disabilities and enabled her to execute
the "contract of guaranty by which she became liable for the debt of the corporation and
that of her husband. Any other interpretation would in effect vitiate chapter 21932 [FTA.
STAT. § 708.08]." It is submitted that the emancipation act is subject to the rule of FLA.
CONST. art. 11, § 1, and to that extent it is vitiated. If the court had analyzed this fact
pattern properly it should have seen that the emancipation act had nothing to do with the
problem.
88. Compare Gallion v. Belk, 180 So.2d 349 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965) with Matthews v.
McCain, 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323 (1936). See also Delong v. Larkin, 208 So.2d 830 (Fla.
1968.)
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was involved in Singletary v. Singletary.89 A husband gave his promissory
note, indorsed by an accommodation indorser, to a creditor. The husband
died and his widow issued her promissory note, indorsed by the same
accommodation indorser who indorsed her husband's note, to a lender and
used the proceeds to pay her husband's note. The accommodation indorser
on the widow's note paid the lender and then sued the widow. The court
held that the widow was liable to her accommodation indorser on the
theory that she was being sued on her own note and not for the debt of
the husband. With a little ingenuity, this case principle could be used to
avoid the constitutional prohibition in numerous cases.
It is submitted that a very recent case pushed the constitutional
mandate to a dryly logical extreme. A wife co-signed a simple promissory
note with her husband and the note was issued to a bank. The proceeds
of the note were placed in the husband's separate checking account and
he used these funds to purchase property as a tenancy by the entirety
with the wife. The husband subsequently died and the bank was denied
any recourse against the wife because of the constitutional prohibition.
Obviously the bank was somewhat to blame for its own loss; however,
it just does not seem proper that the wife should be able to reap the
benefit of the loan and then state it is the husband's debt. The constitu-
tional provision ought to be a shield rather than a sword."
VIII. NOTICE OF DISHONOR AND DISCHARGE
In the average case, the accommodated party (principal debtor) will
sign a promissory note as a maker, and the accommodation party will sign
as an indorser or as a co-maker. However, there is no rule which requires
this order of execution, and, in unusual cases the accommodated party
may be an indorser rather than a maker. For example, assume that Don
Debtor wishes to borrow money but he knows that most potential lenders
in the area will look askance at a note which he offers to give as maker
because of his shaky credit rating. Don Debtor then induces Sam Surety
to execute a note to Albert Accommodating as payee, and Don Debtor
induces Albert Accommodating to indorse the note to him. By this arrange-
ment, Sam and Albert are accommodation parties for Don Debtor. Don
Debtor then indorses the note to Lewis Lender, who subsequently indorses
to a holder in due course who takes without knowledge of the status in
which Sam Surety, Albert Accommodating and Don Debtor became
parties to the instrument.
The holder presents the note to Sam Surety at maturity and the
instrument is dishonored. The holder gives notice of dishonor to Lewis
Lender and Albert Accommodating, but fails to give it to Don Debtor. The
Code provides that "notice of dishonor is necessary to charge any in-
89. 130 Fla. 347, 177 So. 546 (1937).
90. American Nat'l Bank v. Brantley, 204 So.2d 251 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
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dorser" unless notice is excused.9' In a similar vein, any indorser is dis-
charged when without excuse any necessary notice of dishonor is delayed
beyond the time when it is due.92 Of course, the whole problem of lack
of notice to Don Debtor may be eliminated if Sam Surety, Albert Ac-
commodating or Lewis Lender gives notice of dishonor to Don Debtor
because the Code provides that notice of dishonor may be given to any
persons who may be liable on the instrument "by or on behalf of the
holder or any party who has himself received notice, or any other party
who can be compelled to pay the instrument. ')9 3
If we assume, however, that Don Debtor was not given notice by
any one, is he discharged in accordance with the apparent mandates of
the Code? The Code seems to have anticipated this question and pre-
vented any unjust result by providing that notice of dishonor is entirely
excused if the party (Don Debtor) "has no reason to expect or right to
require that the instrument be ... paid. '' 94 There would seem to be little
question that as between the accommodation parties (Sam Surety and
Albert Accommodating) and the principal debtor (Don Debtor), Don
Debtor would have no reason to expect or right to require that the
accommodation parties pay his debt. On the other hand, it may be argued
that the fact that Don Debtor has no right to expect the accommodation
parties to pay his debt to the holder does not affect another fact that the
holder who took the note without knowledge of the arrangement failed
to give notice to Don Debtor and he should be discharged from liability
on the note to the holder. If this view is adopted, the accommodation
parties who are forced to pay are not without recourse because the Code
provides that the accommodation parties have a right of recourse on the
instrument against the accommodated party. 5 This solution would result
in at most a temporary discharge or victory of the accommodated party.
The accommodated party is discharged as to the holder but not discharged
as to the accommodation parties.
The entire presentment for payment and notice of dishonor problem
may be eliminated if the body of the promissory note contains a provision
to the effect that all parties waive presentment for payment, notice of
dishonor and protest." If the body of the note does not contain this
provision, it may be added to the reverse side of the instrument above
the signatures of indorsers. However, "where it is written above the
signature of an indorser it binds him only. 9 7 It is clear that the waiver
91. U.C.C. § 3-501(2) (a).
92. U.C.C. § 3-502(1) (a).
93. U.C.C. § 3-508(1).
94. U.C.C. § 3-511(2)(b).
95. U.C.C. § 3-415(5).
96. U.C.C. § 3-511(6). The pre-code rule in Florida was to the same effect. See Roepke
v. Kaenel, 182 So.2d 651 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
97. U.C.C. § 3-511(6).
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clause on the reverse side of the instrument will not bind parties whose
signatures appear on the face of the instrument, but the effect of this
quoted language on indorsers following the first indorser is uncertain.
This Code provision was derived from section 110 of the N.I.L., and the
majority of courts have held that this provision would bind only the first
indorser. 9s It has been suggested by one authority that the clause should
bind only the first indorser, unless the clause unambiguously refers to
more than one indorser 9
IX. MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
The law of accommodation parties may be further complicated by
statutory enactments or case law which although primarily designed for
problems involving usury, corporations, bankruptcy and homestead have
residuary effects on the overall law of suretyship. For example, a Florida
statute provides that no corporation which shall have refused to pay any
of its obligations "shall transfer any of its property to any of its officers,
directors or stockholders, directly or indirectly, for the payment of any
debt, or upon any other consideration than the full value of the property
paid in cash." 00 In Alberts v. Schneiderman' a corporation assumed
payment on bonds held by the plaintiff. Subsequently, the corporation
borrowed money on a promissory note which was indorsed by Alberts as
an accommodation indorser. Alberts was an officer and director of the
corporation. After the corporation had refused to pay the bondholder, it
made payments on the note. The bondholder obtained judgment against
the corporation for the failure to pay the bonds and then brought an
action against Alberts under the above statute. The court held that the
corporation's payments on the note were "at least an indirect benefit to
him [Alberts] if not a direct benefit,"" 2 and that the judgment creditor
would have a cause of action against Alberts for the amount of this
"benefit." It is to be noted that on these facts it would not be necessary
for the judgment creditor to allege and prove that the corporation was
insolvent when it made the payments to the payee of the promissory note;
refusal to pay other creditors rather than insolvency of the accommodated
party (the corporation) is the criterion. It would appear that this statute
destroys any real right of exoneration or indemnification of a corporate
officer or director who has become an accommodation party for a corpora-
tion which has failed to pay its debts.
Florida and many other states permit the charging of interest at a
higher rate from corporations than from individual borrowers, and many
98. U.C.C. § 3-511, Comment 9. See also W. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 218 (2d ed.
1961).
99. W. BSITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 218 (2d ed. 1961).
100. FLA. STAT. § 608.55 (1967).
101. 182 So.2d 50 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966).
102. Id. at 52.
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lenders insist that individuals form a corporation to appear as the bor-
rower and for the individuals to indorse the loan instruments as accom-
modation parties. Under this arrangement, the lender may charge a higher
rate of interest from the "thin" corporation and still have the security
of the credit of the individual indorsers. The expectations of Florida
lenders will be frustrated in the event that the corporation fails to pay
because although a Florida statute °3 provides that a corporation may
legally bind itself to pay fifteen per cent interest, another statute'014
provides that an individual secondarily "liable as endorser, guarantor,
surety, or otherwise on a corporate obligation" may not be liable for
interest in excess of ten percent per annum. It is submitted that this
statute could not be avoided by having the individual sign as a co-maker.
An accommodation co-maker may not be an "endorser" but he will be
deemed to be a surety.
The Federal bankruptcy law provides that the liability of a surety
for a bankrupt "shall not be altered by the discharge of such bank-
rupt." 0 5 This rule merely codifies the expectations of the lending class
because the possibility of bankruptcy of the principal debtor is one
problem (perhaps the most important one) which lenders intend to
guard against by requiring the principal debtor to have an accommodation
party or parties lend their credit to the loan instrument. If the rule were
to the contrary, the concept of suretyship would soon sink into oblivion.
This "simple" rule presents a trap for the unsophisticated lender which
was described in the recent Florida case of Rose v. Grable.06 The Fed-
eral statute speaks about a "discharge of such bankrupt," and this con-
notes a discharge by operation of law and not by consent of the lender-
creditor. In Rose the principal debtor underwent an arrangement pro-
ceeding under chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. The bankruptcy court
confirmed a plan of arrangement of twenty percent, but, for some un-
disclosed reason, the lender agreed to accept a fifteen percent payment
in full discharge of the debt. The lender then brought suit in the state
court against the alleged accommodation indorser for the unpaid remainder
of the debt. The state court held that the voluntary compromise entered
into between the principal debtor and the lender constituted a discharge
of the surety. The court noted that a composition among creditors under
the bankruptcy act would not have released the accommodation indorser
while a voluntary compromise has the opposite effect.0 7
It is the view of the author that if a "voluntary compromise" in the
bankruptcy court is to be equated with a "release of the principal," then
103. FLA. STAT. § 687.03 (1967).
104. FLA. STAT. § 687.11 (1967).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1964).
106. Rose v. Grable, 203 So.2d 648 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1967).
107. The Rose decision is in accord with the majority view. See 9 COLLIER ON BANx-
RUPTCY § 9.32[111] (14th ed. J. Moore 1964); 10 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1215, note 3
and § 1220 (3d ed. 1967).
ACCOMMODATION PARTIES
the lender should be able to reserve his rights against the accommodation
party in the same instrument by which he manifests his release of the
principal debtor, in accordance with the "reserving of recourse" principle
already discussed. 1 8
The law of accommodation parties becomes even more difficult when
it collides with the Florida homestead laws. In Furlong v. Leybourne,0 9
a husband and wife gave their non-purchase money note and mortgage
on their homestead to a savings and loan institution. The husband used
the loan proceeds to pay his own debt. The husband subsequently died.
The court held that the wife was an accommodation maker as to her de-
ceased husband, but was primarily liable to the savings and loan asso-
ciation. The widow, as accommodation maker, would normally have had
recourse against the estate of her deceased husband. However, the time
for filing claims had passed. The lineal descendants of the deceased hus-
band claimed that the widow (their stepmother) was obligated to pay
the entire indebtedness, while the widow claimed that as an accommoda-
tion maker she was entitled to the protection of the mortgaged property and
that she should not be liable except for a deficiency in the event that the
property sold for less than the amount of the note and mortgage. The
court chose a position somewhat in between these extreme positions. The
widow was held to be obligated to pay the monthly payments as they
fell due. However, she could pay the entire indebtedness and would then
be subrogated to the right of the savings and loan association as against
the real property. If the widow chose this procedure, she could foreclose
the mortgage and wipe out the remainder interests of the lineal descend-
ants. On the other hand, the court seemed to state that if the lineal
descendants chose to pay the entire indebtedness, they in turn would be
subrogated to the savings and loan association's mortgage and could wipe
out the widow's life estate. It would seem that the necessity for the court's
deciding upon either one of these unhappy alternatives would have been
obviated if the lender had filed its claim against the estate of the deceased
husband, or the widow had done likewise, within the proper time.10
108. See notes 58-61 supra, and accompanying text.
109. 138 So.2d 352 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
110. See Gibbons v. Crowder, 208 So.2d 296 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968) and Phillipi Creek
Homes, Inc. v. Arnold, 174 So.2d 552 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965).
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